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A B ST R ACT
This essay examines the distributional effects of
a “cap-and-dividend” policy for reducing carbon
emission in the United States: a policy that auctions carbon permits and rebates the revenue
to the public on an equal per capita basis. The
aim of the policy is to reduce U.S. emissions of
carbon dioxide, the main pollutant causing
global warming, while at the same time protecting the real incomes of middle-income and
lower-income American families. The number of
permits is set by a statutory cap on carbon
emissions that gradually diminishes over time.
The sale of carbon permits will generate very
large revenues, posing the critical question of
who will get the money. The introduction of carbon permits – or, for that matter, any policy to
curb emissions – will raise prices of fossil fuels,

and have a regressive impact on income distribution, since fuel expenditures represent a larger fraction of income for lower-income
households than for upper-income households.
The net effect of carbon emission-reduction
policies depends on who gets the money that
households pay in higher prices. We find that a
cap-and-dividend policy would have a strongly
progressive net effect. Moreover, the majority of
U.S. households would be net winners in purely
monetary terms: that is, their real incomes, after paying higher fuel prices and receiving their
dividends, would rise. From the standpoints of
both distributional equity and political feasibility, a cap-and-dividend policy is therefore an
attractive way to curb carbon emissions.
s
s
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EX EC UTI VE SUMMA RY

FIGURE A: IMPACT ON FAMILY INCOMES
OF A $200/TON CARBON CHARGE

Policies to curb emissions of carbon dioxide –
the main cause of global warming – will inevitably raise the prices of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and
natural gas. The resulting price increases will
reduce the real incomes of American families,
striking hardest at those who can afford it least:
lower-income households for whom fuel costs
represent a higher fraction of their expenditures.
The political feasibility of U.S. efforts to curb carbon emissions may hinge on whether policies
are designed to protect middle-class and poor
families from these adverse income effects.
A “cap-and-dividend” policy offers a simple and
practical way to do this. The policy would auction
carbon permits – rather than giving them free-ofcharge to historic polluters – and then return all
or most of the revenue to American families on
an equal per person basis. Families who consume lower-than-average amounts of fossil fuels
come out ahead, receiving more in dividends
than they pay in higher prices. Those who consume more-than-average amounts pay more.
The policy has three basic steps:
•

•

•

First, U.S. carbon emissions are capped at a
level that gradually declines over time. One
widely discussed target is to reduce emissions 80% below their current level by the
year 2050.
Second, based on the cap in a given year,
permits are auctioned to firms that bring
fossil carbon into the economy (whether
through domestic extraction or imports). The
supply of permits in a given year is fixed by
the cap; their price depends on the demand
for them.
Third, revenue from the sale of permits is
deposited into a trust fund and paid out
equally to every woman, man, and child in
the country. In addition, some fraction of
the revenue initially may be earmarked for
other uses, such as transitional adjustment
assistance.
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This paper calculates the net effects of a capand-dividend policy on income distribution in the
United States. We estimate that a permit price of
$200 per ton of carbon would reduce U.S. emissions by approximately seven percent. The resulting increases in the prices of fossil fuels, and
in the prices of goods and services produced
with them, would raise the cost of living of the
median American family by $1,570 per year. The
price increases would represent a larger percentage of family income in poor households
than in more affluent households (see Figure A).
FIGURE B: NET IMPACT ON FAMILY
INCOMES OF A CAP-AND-DIVIDEND POLICY
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The revenue from the sale of carbon permits
would amount to roughly $200 billion per year.
If this revenue is recycled to the public equally,
the majority of households receive more in dividends than they pay as a result of higher fossil
fuel prices. The net impact ranges from a 14.8%
income gain for the poorest 20% of families
(and a 24% gain for the poorest 10%) to a 2.4%
loss for richest 20% (see Figure B).
Initially earmarking a modest fraction of the
carbon revenues for other uses, such as transitional adjustment assistance, could further enhance the appeal of the cap-and-dividend policy.
Up to 10% of the carbon revenues can be dedicated to other uses while maintaining positive
net benefits for roughly 50% of households.

Withholding carbon revenues beyond this
threshold would push the net beneficiary share
of the population below half.
A cap-and-dividend policy will assert the principle of common ownership of nature’s wealth:
the right to benefit from our share of the Earth’s
capacity to absorb carbon emissions is allocated equally to all Americans. It will protect the
real incomes of the majority of Americans while
curbing global warming and hastening the U.S.
economy’s transition towards the energy
sources of the future. From the standpoints of
both distributional equity and political feasibility,
a cap-and-dividend policy is therefore an attractive way to curb carbon emissions.
s
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FIGURE 1B: CARBON EMISSIONS PER CAPITA OF
THE U.S, CHINA, AND EU-15, 1987-2005
(MILLION METRIC TONS)
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II . T HE C ARBON EC ON OM Y
The United States is the world’s top emitter
of carbon dioxide (CO2), the most important
greenhouse gas. The burning of fossil fuels in
the U.S. released 1.6 billion metric tons (mt) of
carbon (5.9 billion mt of CO2) in 2005. This is
12% more than China, the second-largest emitter, and 65% more than the EU-15 (see Figure 1a).
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Any policy to curb carbon emissions will raise
prices of fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas –
and the prices of other goods and services in
proportion to the use of fossil fuels in supplying
them. These price increases will reduce the real
incomes of Americans in general, and low-income
and middle-class American households in particular. But for every dollar paid by consumers in
higher prices, someone else receives a dollar in
additional income. Recycling this money to the
public would protect real incomes of the majority
of Americans. This paper examines how this can
be done by a cap-and-dividend policy that distributes carbon revenues equally to all.
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Political winds in the country are now shifting. At
the Group of Eight summit meeting in Germany
in June 2007, the Bush administration agreed to
re-enter international climate negotiations and
to “seriously consider” a European plan to cut
greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2050. A
legislative proposal unveiled in August 2007 by
U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman and John Warner goes further, calling for a 70% reduction by
2050. It now seems possible, even likely, that
the U.S. will adopt a serious emissions-reduction
policy early in the post-Bush administration.
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The Clinton administration signed the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which envisioned a 7% cut in
U.S. carbon emissions from their 1990 level by
the year 2012. But the Senate refused to ratify
the agreement, and when the government of
George W. Bush came to power it announced it
had “no interest” in the accord.

CHINA, AND EU-15, 1987-2005 1
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The time is coming when the United States
government will enact policies to curb emissions
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases,
joining the efforts of other nations to confront the
historic challenge of global warming. When this
happens, a key question – from the standpoints
of both fairness and political feasibility – will be
how to protect the incomes of American families.

FIGURE 1A: CARBON EMISSIONS OF THE U.S,
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I . INT R ODUC TI ON
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TABLE 1: CARBON DIOXIDE EMI SSIONS BY FUEL SOURCE AND SECTOR, 2004
(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS OF CO2)
Fuel Source

Petroleum

Coal

a
Natural Gas Other

total

% via electricit

Residential

141.6

695.4

372.8

4.1

1213.9

69.4

Transportation

1902.7

3.8

32.7

0.0

1939.2

0.2
38.1

b

Industrial

465.4

747.4

519.9

3.3

1736.0

Commercial

88.2

669.0

272.9

3.9

1034.1

77.4

Total

2597.9

2115.6 1198.3

11.3

5923.2

39

(%)

43.9

35.7

0.2

100

20.2

a. “Other” includes emissions from electricity generation from municipal solid waste and geothermal energy.
b. Industrial emissions from coal include net coke imports.
Source: Calculated from U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Historical Data Series. For details, see endnote 2.

they consume – varies depending on their total
expenditure and its composition. Table 2 shows
how expenditure patterns varied across households in 2003, ranging from the poorest tenth of
the population, whose annual per capita expenditure was under $2,000, to the richest tenth,
whose per capita expenditure was close to
$30,000. 3

In per capita terms, U.S. emissions are five
times higher than China’s and more than double
those of the EU-15 (see Figure 1b).
2

The composition of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions across fuels and sectors is shown in Table
1. Petroleum accounts for roughly 44% of emissions, coal for 36%, and natural gas for 20%.
Electricity generation using these fuels accounts
for 39% of the total, with coal-fired plants accounting for more than four-fifths of this
amount. Transportation accounts for roughly
one-third of total emissions, industry for a further 29%, residential energy use for 20%, and
commercial energy use for 18%.

The carbon content of various categories of
consumption items can be calculated from input-output accounts. These provide detailed
data on the inputs used by each industry, making it possible to trace the price effects of a
change in fossil fuel prices from industry to
prices. For this purpose we rely on calculations
by Metcalf (1999), updating his measure to reflect 2003 prices. 4 The results are presented in

The “carbon footprint” of individual American
households – the amount of carbon emissions
generated in supplying the goods and services

TABLE 2: CONSUMPTION PATTERNS BY EXPENDITURE DECILE, 2003
Per capita
expenditure decile

Per capita
expenditure ($)

Food

Average per capita expenditures by consumption category ($)
Industrial
goods

Services

Electricity

Household
fuels

Car
fuels

Air
transport

Other
transport

1

1927

659

225

729

128

52

124

3

8

2

3521

1118

426

1418

227

83

226

11

13

3

4736

1361

638

2001

278

113

304

23

18

4

5991

1621

904

2559

341

144

375

28

19

5

7380

1813

1188

3351

349

164

444

45

27

6

8847

2051

1795

3849

380

186

489

67

30

7

10711

2297

2219

4901

415

211

537

83

46

8

13228

2559

3343

5880

459

214

614

105

54

9

17178

3081

4821

7489

519

273

735

177

83

10

29943

4292

10908

12363

642

334

888

367

149

Total

10346

2085

2647

4454

374

177

474

91

45

Source: Authors’ calculations from Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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Table 3. As one would expect, the most carbonintensive categories of consumption are electricity, household fuels (primarily heating oil and
natural gas) and car fuels, each of which generates more than two metric tons of carbon per
$1000 expenditure. The least carbon-intensive
category is services, for which the corresponding figure is 80 kilograms.

As one might expect, households with higher
expenditure generally have bigger carbon footprints. As shown in the final column of Table 4,
carbon emissions per person in the richest decile (tenth) of the population are more than double the national average, and more than eight
times higher than the lowest decile.

TABLE 3: CARBON EMISSIONS PER DOLLAR
EXPENDITURE BY CONSUMPTION CATEGORY
Consumption category

tC per $1000 (2003 dollars)

Food

0.15

Industrial goods

0.14

Services

0.08

Electricity

2.82

Household fuels

2.64

Car fuels

2.08

Air transport

0.56

Other transport

0.30

metric tons of carbon emissions. 5 Direct energy
use in the form of car fuels, residential electricity, and household fuels (mainly heating oil and
natural gas) accounts for roughly three-fifths of
these emissions. Indirect use, via carbon emissions generated in producing other goods and
services consumed by the household, account
for the remaining two-fifths.

Source: Calculated from Metcalf (1999); see text for
details.

Combining the information in Tables 2 and 3,
we can examine the average carbon emissions
from U.S. household consumption across the
range of per capita expenditure. The results are
presented in Table 4. The consumption of the
average American, with per capita expenditure
of about $10,000, generates approximately 3.7

Carbon emissions per dollar decline, however,
as household expenditure rises. In the top decile, one dollar of expenditure on average generates 0.27 kilograms (kg) of carbon emissions; in
the lowest decile the corresponding figure is
0.50 kg. The reason lies in their consumption
patterns, as can be seen in Table 3: the poor
spend a larger fraction of their household
budget on electricity and fuels, while more affluent households spend a larger fraction on
services and industrial goods. It so happens
that necessities, which account for a larger
share of the expenditure of the poor, are morecarbon-intensive than luxuries, which account
for a larger share of the expenditure of the well-

TABLE 4: CARBON EMISSIONS BY EXPENDITURE DECILE
(METRIC TONS OF CARBON PER YEAR)

Per capita
expenditure
decile

Per capita
expenditure ($)

Average per capita carbon emissions by expenditure category
Food

Industrial
goods

Services

Electricity

Household
fuels

Car
fuels

Air
transport

Other
transport

1

1927

0.10

0.03

0.05

0.36

0.15

0.26

0.002

0.002

0.96

2

3521

0.18

0.06

0.10

0.64

0.23

0.47

0.006

0.004

1.69

3

4736

0.21

0.09

0.15

0.79

0.32

0.63

0.013

0.005

2.21

4

5991

0.25

0.13

0.21

0.96

0.39

0.78

0.016

0.006

2.74

5

7380

0.27

0.17

0.27

0.99

0.46

0.92

0.025

0.008

3.11

6

8847

0.30

0.27

0.32

1.07

0.51

1.02

0.037

0.009

3.53

7

10711

0.34

0.33

0.41

1.17

0.58

1.12

0.047

0.014

4.01

8

13228

0.37

0.50

0.50

1.30

0.59

1.28

0.059

0.016

4.60

9

17178

0.44

0.72

0.64

1.47

0.75

1.53

0.099

0.025

5.66

10

29943

0.59

1.63

1.08

1.81

0.91

1.85

0.206

0.044

8.13

Total

10346

0.31

0.39

0.37

1.06

0.49

0.98

0.051

0.013

3.67

Source: Authors’ calculations using data in Tables 2 and 3.

Total carbon
emissions per
capita
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II I. THE CASE FOR A
C AP -AN D- DIV I DEN D P OL IC Y

FIGURE 2: CARBON EMISSIONS AND
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE, 2003
carbon emissions (tons carbon)

to-do. As a result, carbon emissions rise with
household expenditure at a diminishing rate
(see Figure 2). As discussed in the next section,
this concave relationship has important implications for the distributional effects of public policies to reduce carbon emissions.
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6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
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The most reliable way to reduce carbon emissions is to establish a “cap,” a limit on the total
amount of fossil-fuel carbon that enters the U.S.
economy in a given year. The cap can gradually
be lowered over time to meet targets for emissions reductions in future years. Based on the
cap, a fixed number of annual permits are issued
to suppliers of fossil fuels, including both domestic producers and importers. Whether these permits are sold or given away, they represent a
claim on a scarce resource – the U.S. share of
the biosphere’s capacity to absorb and recycle
carbon – and as such they have economic value.
The net effect of emission-reduction policies on
household incomes depends on:
(i) how the household is impacted by higher
prices for fossil fuels, and

1.0
0.0
$0

$5,000

$10,000

$15,000

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

$35,000

expenditure per capita

Source: See Table 4.

per capita basis, a policy sometimes termed a
“sky trust” (Barnes 2001). 7 We refer to these
three policy options as “cap-and-giveaway,”
“cap-and-spend,” and “cap-and-dividend,” respectively (see Figure 3).
FIGURE 3: THREE POLICY OPTIONS FOR
CARBON PERMIT ALLOCATION

Cap-and-Giveaway

or

Cap-and-Auction

(ii) how the economic value represented by carbon permits is distributed.
If the permits are given away, a key issue is who
gets them. If they are sold, a key issue is who
gets the money.
If the permits are given free-of-charge to energy
companies – based, for example, on their historic levels of sales of fossil fuels – the result is
a windfall gain to these firms, or more precisely,
to their shareholders. 6 If the permits are auctioned to the highest bidder and the proceeds
are retained by the government, the revenue is
similar to that from a tax, and the money can be
used to increase government spending and/or
cut other taxes. In this paper we analyze a third
option, in which the permits are auctioned and
the revenue is rebated to the public on an equal

Cap-and-Dividend

or

Cap-and-Spend

From open access to common wealth
The enactment of policies to curb carbon emissions is tantamount to the creation of property
rights to the sky, or more precisely, to the carbon-absorptive capacity of the biosphere. In the
absence of such policies, this is an “open access” resource, in principle freely available to all
but in practice disproportionately available to
those with the wealth and power to claim it:
those who burn the most fossil fuel. 8 Government regulations, carbon taxes, and carbon
permits all assert the right to regulate access to
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this resource, effectively converting it into a
form of property.
The question then becomes, who are the rightful
owners of this property? If we believe that the
gifts of creation are held by all of us in common,
rather than being the property of private owners
or the government, then the answer is clear: it
belongs equally to every woman, man, and child
in the country.
A cap-and-dividend policy would transform the
U.S. share of the Earth’s carbon-absorptive capacity from an open-access resource into the
common wealth of all Americans. As a way to
curb U.S. carbon emissions, this policy has four
attractive features:
•

First, the cap-and-dividend policy puts into
practice the principle of common ownership
of nature’s wealth: rights to benefit from the
carbon-absorptive capacities of the biosphere are allocated equally to all.

•

Second, the cap-and-dividend policy protects
the real incomes of the majority of the population in the face of higher prices for fossil
fuels, surmounting a major political impediment to the adoption of policies to curb
global warming.

•

Third, the cap-and-dividend policy results in a
progressive redistribution of income, the
scale of which depends on the level of the
carbon charges and how the carbon intensity
of household expenditure varies with income.

•

Fourth, unlike carbon taxes or a cap-andspend policy, the cap-and-dividend policy’s
favorable distributional outcome does not
hinge on the willingness and ability of the
government to do “the right thing” – however
this may be defined – with present and future carbon revenues. 9

How would a cap-and-dividend policy work?
The cap-and-dividend policy would deposit the
revenues from auction sales of carbon permits
into a trust fund, an autonomous institution
apart from the government budget, akin to the

Social Security Trust Fund. These revenues
would then be rebated to individuals on an
equal per person basis.
Carbon revenues would be most easily collected
“upstream,” at the mine heads, oil refineries,
natural gas pipelines, and ports where fossil fuels
enter the U.S. economy. Nationwide there would
be roughly 2000 such collection points (Kopp et
al. 1999; CBO 2001). The costs of collecting the
revenue would represent a very small fraction of
the amount collected; the administrative costs of
petroleum taxes and excise duties currently
range from 0.12 to 0.25% of revenue (Smulders
and Vollebergh, 2001, p. 116). 10
A fixed number of carbon permits would be auctioned (monthly, quarterly, or annually), with the
number determined by the national carbon cap
at any given point in time. Permit holders would
be entitled to bring fossil carbon into the economy within a specified time (say, one year from
the date of purchase of the permit). A secondary
market in permits could emerge – permit holders who decide not to use their carbon allotment could sell it to others – but with frequent
auctions and limited permit life spans, this market would likely be small relative to the total
number of permits.
The number of permits issued would diminish
over time, as the cap on carbon emissions is
gradually tightened. Issuing a fixed number of
permits rather than setting a fixed carbon
charge (a “carbon tax”) would guarantee that
the nation’s emission-reduction objectives are
achieved. The price of the permits would depend on demand and supply. When the economy is booming, for example, higher demand for
permits will lead to a higher price than when the
economy is sluggish. Similarly, if higher fossil
fuel prices and other policies spark rapid improvements in energy efficiency and development of renewable energy sources, the carbon
permit price will be lower than if these occur
more slowly. In contrast, setting a fixed price
instead of a fixed number of permits would allow the quantity of carbon emissions to vary
depending on these and other factors. Given the
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uncertainties as to the extent of emission reductions, the price-setting approach also could be
more vulnerable to erroneous forecasts or political manipulations that undermine emissionreduction goals.
Revenues from the sale of carbon permits
would be paid out equally to every man, woman,
and child in the country. One way to distribute
these dividends would be to issue “Sky Trust
cards” that could be used at automatic teller
machines (ATMs) to withdraw cash. If permit
auctions are held quarterly, the balances in
every individual’s account would be topped up
quarterly, too. As with bank accounts, individuals could check their balances online, as well as
at the ATM. The administrative costs of issuing
Sky Trust cards would be no greater than the
current cost of issuing Social Security cards; in
fact, after the initial distribution to existing
holders of Social Security cards, the two operations could be combined.
In the case of children, an alternative way to
distribute carbon revenues would be to accumulate their dividends in individual development
accounts (IDAs) until they reach the age of
eighteen. They could withdraw funds as they
enter adulthood, perhaps with rules or incentives to encourage investment in further education or purchases of homes or businesses.
The introduction of carbon permits would alter
relative prices throughout the economy. Fossil
fuels, and goods and services whose supply
relies heavily on them, would become more expensive, strengthening incentives to invest in
energy efficiency and non-fossil energy sources.
The energy investment playing field, which is
currently tilted in favor of fossil fuels by the implicit subsidy resulting from free use of the
Earth’s finite capacity to recycle emissions,
would become more level. The playing field
could be further leveled by ending the explicit
government subsidies currently given to fossilfuel industries in the form of tax breaks and
royalty-free access to public lands. Redirection
of subsidies to public investment in energy

FIGURE 4: CAP-AND-DIVIDEND POLICY

Carbon Cap
Redirect Energy
Subsidies

Carbon Revenues

Dividends
to the Public

Transitional
Adjustment
Assistance

Price Effect:
Investment Incentives

Private Investment in
Renewable
Energy and Efficiency

Public Investment in
Renewable
Energy and Efficiency

efficiency and renewable energy would complement the stimulus to private investment arising
from the realignment of relative prices.
The redirection of private investment is crucial
for any strategy to curb global warming. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2007, p. 13), which foresees future energy investments totaling more than $20 trillion
worldwide between now and 2030, observes
that limiting global carbon emissions to 2005
levels by 2030 “would require a large shift in
the pattern of investment, although the net additional investment required ranges from negligible to 5-10%.”
As documented below, a cap-and-dividend policy would protect the real incomes of the majority of American families in the face of rising
fossil fuel prices. But households and communities that currently depend on employment in
fossil fuel-intensive industries, such as coal mining, would nevertheless see income losses. To
protect these vulnerable sectors, a fraction of
the revenue from the sale of carbon permits
could be earmarked initially for transitional adjustment assistance. For example, Barnes
(2001) proposes a transition fund that initially
would recycle 25% of the revenue and gradually
be phased out over a ten-year period.
Figure 4 summarizes the basic features of a
cap-and-dividend policy: cap carbon emissions;
auction permits to bring fossil carbon into the
economy; distribute revenues from permit sales
to the public, with a fraction initially earmarked
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for transitional adjustment assistance; realign
incentives for private investment; and redirect
government subsidies to public investments in
energy efficiency and renewable energy.

expenditure. The cost of living in richest decile
would rise by $1,475 per person, but this would
be equivalent to less than 5 per cent of annual
expenditure.

In the next section, we analyze how a cap-anddividend policy would affect the distribution of
income in the United States. Before doing so,
we briefly review prior studies on the distributional impacts of higher fossil fuel prices and
carbon revenue recycling.

Previous studies have reached similar conclusions. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), in an analysis of the distributional impacts
of carbon permits, estimated that the price effects would reduce real incomes in the lowest
quintile of the income distribution by 3.3%, almost twice the 1.7% reduction in the highest
quintile (CBO 2000, p. 21). In a follow-on study,
Dinan and Rogers (2002, p. 212) report an even
sharper disparity: reductions of 6.6% and 1.7%
for the poorest and richest quintiles, respectively.
In estimates based on a higher carbon price,
Barnes and Breslow (2003, p. 144) report the
cost for the lowest decile to be equivalent to
16.8% of income, whereas the cost for the top
decile is equivalent to 2.5% of income.

Distributional impact of higher fossil fuel prices
Carbon emission-reduction policies – whether in
the form of regulations, carbon taxes, or caps
and permits – will raise the price of fossil fuels,
at least in the foreseeable future. The increased
price is the flip side of reduced use. The higher
cost of coal, oil, and natural gas in turn alters
relative prices of goods and services throughout
the economy in proportion to the carbon embodied in their production and distribution. In the
end, the price increases are passed along to
consumers (although producers may absorb
part of the cost via lower profit margins, a possibility to which we return below).
The result of higher prices, in terms of absolute
dollars, is that those who consume more fossil
fuels directly in the form of energy, and indirectly in the form of other goods and services
whose supply uses fossil fuels, pay more. Since
the rich generally consume more of most things
than the poor, they pay more (although how
much any specific household pays depends on
its consumption decisions). Relative to total
expenditure, however, the poor pay more as
noted above. This means that carbon emissionreduction policies have a regressive impact on
income distribution – unless coupled with revenue-recycling policies that protect the real incomes of the poor and middle classes.
Based on the data in Table 4, for example, we
can calculate that a $200/ton price for carbon
would translate into a $215 rise in the cost of
living for the average person in poorest decile,
equivalent to more than 10 per cent of annual

Studies in other industrialized countries generally support the conclusion that carbon charges
are regressive – taking a bigger slice in percentage terms from low-income households
than from high-income households – or, at best,
distributionally neutral or mixed. An analysis by
Symons et al. (1994) found that a carbon tax in
the United Kingdom would be “severely regressive.” In Canada, Hamilton and Cameron (1994)
concluded that a carbon tax would be “moderately regressive.” Cornwell and Creedy (1996)
likewise found that a carbon tax in Australia
would be regressive. Symons et al. (2000) reported regressive effects in Germany, France,
and Spain, a mixed effect in the UK, and a neutral effect in Italy. Klinge Jacobsen et al. (2003)
and Wier et al. (2005) found that Denmark’s
existing carbon taxes are regressive, and
Brännlund and Nordström (2004) reported that
increases in carbon taxes in Sweden would be
regressive. 11 Summarizing studies from a number of OECD countries, Cramton and Kerr
(1999, p. 261) conclude: “The weak regressivity
of carbon regulation appears to hold across
countries and modeling techniques.” 12
s
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Carbon revenue recycling
When consumers pay higher prices for goods and
services, in proportion to the fossil carbon embodied in them, a great deal of money changes
hands. The net effect of carbon charges depends
crucially on where this money goes.
Recognizing that carbon charges could generate annual revenues of “tens or hundreds of
billions of dollars,” the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office (2000) compared two methods
of allocating carbon emission allowances: selling them through an auction, or giving them
away free-of-charge to the energy companies
that produce and import fossil fuels. The CBO
also compared two methods of revenue recycling: reducing corporate taxes or rebating an
identical lump-sum amount to each household.
The only policy mix found to have a progressive
distributional effect was the “sky trust” combination of permit sales and lump-sum redistribution of the revenues. 13 In this case, the
regressive effect of fossil-fuel price increases
was outweighed by the progressive effect of
equal payments to each household. With a
carbon charge of $100/ton, the CBO estimated
that after-tax incomes in the lowest quintile of
the income distribution would rise by 1.8%,
while those of the top quintile would decrease
by 0.9%. In an extension of the CBO analysis,
Dinan and Rogers (2002) reported somewhat
stronger redistributive impacts: a 3.5% rise in
incomes for the lowest quintile, coupled with a
1.6% decline for the top quintile. 14
Both of these studies assumed that carbon
charges create “deadweight losses” by reducing
fossil fuel consumption (and also, in the Dinan
and Rogers study, by lowering real returns to
labor and capital and thereby reducing factor
supplies). For example, when consumers curtail
fuel consumption in response to higher prices,
they experience welfare losses in the form of
“the discomfort associated with keeping their
house cooler in the winter or the loss in satisfaction that would result from canceling a vacation because of high gasoline prices” (CBO
2003, p. 3). The studies add these losses to the

monetary costs borne by consumers in the form
of higher prices for the fossil fuels that they continue to consume.
Neither study accounted, however, for the welfare gains that would result from reduced use of
fossil fuels. These include benefits from the
mitigation of climate change and “co-benefits”
from reduced emissions of other pollutants,
including airborne particulates and sulfur dioxide, that are released by burning fossil fuels. 15
Yet the rationale for policies to reduce carbon
emissions is precisely that the welfare gains to
society exceed the welfare losses. A comprehensive analysis of the welfare impacts of carbon emission-reduction policies would allocate
these gains across households, too. In the absence of such an accounting, the incorporation
of “deadweight losses” from carbon caps gives
a misleading picture of net effects: it counts the
cost of reducing carbon emissions without
counting the benefits.
The effect of this one-sided treatment of welfare
effects is that the total costs of carbon charges
(from higher prices plus “deadweight losses”)
exceed the total amount of revenue to be recycled (from higher prices alone). This understates
the cap-and-dividend policy’s positive impact on
incomes of low-income households, and overstates its negative impact on those of highincome households.
In this paper, we adopt the simpler – and, in our
view, more appropriate – procedure of estimating the monetary impacts of carbon charges and
revenue recycling alone, without attempting to
incorporate other welfare effects. Barnes and
Breslow (2003) followed this procedure in a third
analysis of the distributional impact of a capand-dividend policy. 16 They find that the bottom
decile would receive a net benefit equal to 5.1%
of income, while the top decile would bear a net
loss of 0.9%. Roughly 70% of the population
sees net gains, getting more back in dividends
than they pay in higher fuel prices. Insofar as
public policy is guided by majority rule, this augurs well for the political feasibility of a cap-anddividend policy for curbing carbon emissions.
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I V . DI STRI BUTI ON AL IMPACTS
OF A CA P-AN D-DI VI DEND POLICY
In this section we provide new estimates of the
impacts of a cap-and-dividend policy on the distribution of income in the United States, taking
into account both the impact of higher prices on
consumers and the recycling of carbon revenue
via equal per capita dividends.
Apart from using more recent data for these
calculations, our analysis differs from prior studies in several respects. We stratify households
on the basis of expenditure rather than income,
on the grounds that expenditure is a better
proxy for lifetime income. Since households differ in size, we use expenditure per person rather
than expenditure per household, on the grounds
that this is a better measure of relative income.
In addition to our baseline estimate of the net
impact of a cap-and-dividend policy, the next
section examines how the results change when
some fraction of the carbon revenue is allocated
initially to other uses, such as transitional adjustment assistance. In the appendix, we also
show how the results are affected if we assume
that some fraction of the cost of carbon permits
is absorbed by producers via lower profit margins, instead of being entirely “passed through”
to consumers.
What price for carbon?
The amount of money that will be generated by
the sale of carbon permits depends on both the
quantity of permits sold and their price. The
quantity is set by the carbon emission cap. The
price depends on the price elasticities of demand for fossil fuels, which translate changes in
quantity into changes in prices.
No one can be certain as to the precise magnitude of these elasticities, particularly in the longrun when induced technological changes are
taken into account. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (2007, p. 19), for example,
reports that carbon prices of $20-295 per ton
($5-80 per ton of CO2) in the year 2030 would be
consistent with a trajectory for eventual stabiliza-

tion of atmospheric concentrations in the year
2100. This wide price range illustrates why setting a cap on the quantity of permits and letting
market forces determine their price is preferable
to setting a price on permits (or levying a carbon
tax) and letting market forces determine the
quantity of emissions. If our central aim is to
meet a timetable for emissions reductions, fixing
the quantity guarantees that we will hit the target. Fixing the price does not.
While we do not know the precise magnitude of
the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels, we
do know that it is inelastic, particularly in the
short run; that is, the percentage change in
price exceeds the associated percentage
change in quantity demanded. With a price elasticity of -0.2, for example, a 2% reduction in
quantity requires a 10% increase in price. This
means that the lower the quantity of emissions
permitted under the cap (and the higher the
price of the permits), the greater the total
amount of revenue.
We base the calculations that follow on a permit
price of $200 per ton of carbon (tC). This is near
the middle of the range of carbon price scenarios used in the literature reviewed by Barnes
and Breslow (2003, pp. 142-3). It is also close
to the initial price of $180/tC ($50/tCO2) that a
recent study by the MIT Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change reckons is
needed to achieve an 80% reduction in emissions by the year 2050, with the price gradually
rising to $730/tC by that year (Paltsev et al.,
2007). While the price we use for our calculations affects the magnitudes of costs and benefits, it does not affect their distributional pattern
across households: if the permit price were
higher, then the costs, dividends, and net benefits would rise; if the price were lower, they
would be smaller. 17
Table 5 shows how a $200/tC charge would
change energy prices, assuming the cost to be
entirely passed through into the price to endusers. Price increases for gasoline, heating oil,
and natural gas are in the 20-30% range. The
price of coal rises much more steeply due to its
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TABLE 5: IMPACTS OF $200/TON CARBON CHARGE ON FOSSIL FUEL PRICE S
Fuel

Price (2006) a

Carbon charge

Price increase

Gasoline

$2.53/gallon

$0.53/gallon

21%

Heating oil

$2.42/gallon

$0.71/gallon

29%

Natural gas (residential)

$13.76/1000 cu. ft.

$3.26/1000 cu. ft.

Coal (delivered to electric utilities)

$31.22/short ton

$116/short ton

371%

24%

Electricity

9.45 cents/kwh

3.68 cents/kwh

39%

Note: a. Coal and electricity prices refer to the year 2005.
Sources: Price data from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). For each individual fuel reference, see endnote 17.

relatively low price and high carbon content,
and electricity prices rise by nearly 40%.
To calculate how these price increases impact
households, we use the data on consumption
patterns and the carbon content of goods and
services reported in Tables 2 to 4. To incorporate the response of consumers to changes in
relative prices, we use estimates drawn from
other studies of the price elasticities of demand
for the various consumption categories. 18 These
are reported in Table 6.
TABLE 6: PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND

Consumption category

Price elasticity of demand

Food

0.6

Industrial goods

1.3

Services

1

Electricity

0.2

Natural gas

0.2

Heating oil

0.27

Car fuels

0.26

Air transport

0.25

Other transport

0.25

Note: Short-run own price elasticities of demand.

We estimate that a $200 per ton carbon charge
would reduce U.S. emissions by approximately
7%. Put differently, if a cap on annual carbon
emissions is set at 7% below current levels, and
the corresponding number of carbon permits is
auctioned to fossil fuel suppliers, we estimate
that the market price for these permits will be
approximately $200/tC. At this price, the total
amount of revenue generated by permit sales is
$198 billion per year. 19
S

Baseline scenario
In Table 7, we present the distributional impacts
of a cap-and-dividend policy, with the entire cost
of carbon permits passed through to consumers
and the entire revenue from the sale of permits
recycled to the public in the form of equal per
capita dividends. The amount per person that
households pay in higher prices is reported
in the “charge” column. This amount rises
with per capita household expenditure, from
$215/person/year in the poorest decile to
$1,475/person/year in the richest decile.
The dividend is the same across all households:
$678 per person. For the bottom six deciles, this
exceeds the amount paid in higher prices; for the
top four deciles the charge exceeds the dividend.
In other words, roughly 60% of Americans come
out ahead in sheer monetary terms from the capand-dividend policy, while 40% pay more in
higher prices than they get back in their share of
the dividends. The poorer the household, the
larger the net benefit; the richer the household,
the larger the net cost. The policy increases net
incomes in the poorest decile by 24.0%, while net
incomes in the richest decile decline by 2.7%.
These estimates are decile averages. But for
any individual household, the net impact of the
cap-and-dividend policy depends on its consumption pattern and how much it responds to
changing relative prices by shifting from more
carbon-intensive to less carbon-intensive consumption. Any household that curtails its direct
and indirect consumption of fossil fuels to a
level below the national average comes out
ahead, receiving more money in dividends than
it pays in higher prices, regardless of its expen-
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TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF A CAP-AND-DIVIDEND POLICY
(BASED ON A CARBON CHARGE OF $200/TC, WI TH 100% RECYCLING TO INDIVIDUALS)
Per capita
expenditure decile

Per capita
expenditure ($)

Average
household size

Per capita incidence ($)

As percentage of expenditures

Charge

Dividend

Net benefit

Charge

Dividend

Net benefit

1

1927

3.4

215

678

463

11.2%

35.2%

24.0%

2

3521

3.3

338

678

341

9.6%

19.3%

9.7%

3

4736

3.2

424

678

254

9.0%

14.3%

5.4%

4

5991

2.7

514

678

164

8.6%

11.3%

2.7%

5

7380

2.6

576

678

102

7.8%

9.2%

1.4%

6

8847

2.5

649

678

30

7.3%

7.7%

0.3%

7

10711

2.3

732

678

-53

6.8%

6.3%

-0.5%

8

13228

2.1

837

678

-158

6.3%

5.1%

-1.2%

9

17178

2.0

1024

678

-346

6.0%

3.9%

-2.0%

10

29943

1.8

1475

678

-797

4.9%

2.3%

-2.7%

Source: Authors’ calculations (see text for details).

diture decile. The policy rewards “good behavior” – reductions in carbon emissions – across
the income spectrum.
s
s
Cap-and-dividend versus cap-and-giveaway

income households, with the top tenth owning
nearly 65% of the total, and the top two-tenths
owning 77%. Using these figures, we can approximate the distributional effects of a capand-giveaway policy. 22

The cap-and-dividend distributional outcome
differs radically from what would happen under a
cap-and-giveaway policy in which carbon permits
are distributed free-of-charge to fossil-fuel firms.
Both policies would increase the prices of fossil
fuels, and of other goods and services in proportion to the use of fossil fuels in their supply, but
instead of capturing the “rent” from permit
sales and rebating it to the public on an equal
per person basis, the cap-and-giveaway policy
would generate windfall profits for fossil-fuel
firms. These profits would flow to shareholders
in the form of higher dividends and capital gains,
benefiting households in proportion to their
ownership of corporate stock. In the words of a
U.S. Congressional Budget Office report (2007.
p. 2), a giveaway strategy “would transfer income from energy consumers – among whom
lower-income households would bear disproportionately large burdens – to shareholders of energy companies, who are disproportionately
higher-income households.” 20

Table 9 summarizes distributional outcomes under these two policy scenarios. In contrast to capand-dividend, the cap-and-giveaway policy results
in a regressive redistribution of income and imposes net costs on the majority of American
households: the bottom nine deciles pay more as
a result of higher fuel prices than they receive in
stock dividends and capital gains. The contrast
between the distributional outcomes of the two
policies is depicted graphically in Figure 5, with
the deciles combined into quintiles for simplicity.

Data on the distribution of stock ownership
by income decile are presented in Table 8. 21
Stock ownership is concentrated in upper-

TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP

Per capita
income decile

Stock
ownership

1

7437

Share of total
stock
o nership
0.8%

2

4564

0.5%

3

8697

0.9%

4

16069

1.7%

5

23066

2.4%

6

40296

4.2%

7

54571

5.7%

8

67427

7.0%

9

116542

12.1%

10

626335

64.9%

Source: Calculated from 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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TABLE 9: CAP-AND-GIVEAWAY VERSUS CAP-AND-DIVIDEND
Cap-and-Giveaway

Cap-and-Dividend

Household size

Net benefits per As % of total
capita ($)
expenditures

Net benefits per As % of total
capita ($)
expenditures

1927

3.4

-91

-4.7%

463

24.0%

3521

3.3

-244

-6.9%

341

9.7%

3

4736

3.2

-309

-6.5%

254

5.4%

4

5991

2.7

-355

-5.9%

164

2.7%

5

7380

2.6

-377

-5.1%

102

1.4%

6

8847

2.5

-342

-3.9%

30

0.3%

7

10711

2.3

-336

-3.1%

-53

-0.5%

8

13228

2.1

-360

-2.7%

-158

-1.2%

Per capita
expenditure
decile

Per capita
expenditure ($)

1
2

9

17178

2.0

-231

-1.3%

-346

-2.0%

10

29943

1.8

2645

8.8%

-797

-2.7%

Based on a carbon charge of $200 per tC.
Source: Authors’ calculations (see text for details).

FIGURE 5: CAP-AND-DIVIDEND VERSUS
CAP-AND-GIVEAWAY
20.0%
Lowest Quintile
Second Quintile
Third Quintile
Highest Qunitile
-6.2%

0.8%

3.9%

5.0%

5.1%

Fourth Quintile

10.0%

-4.5%

15.0%

14.8%
Cap and Dividend

-2.9%

-6.2%

-5.0%

-2.4%

0.0%
-0.9%

In the absence of revenue recycling, the price
increases arising from a carbon cap that yields a
$200/tC permit price would raise the cost of living of the median American family by about
$1,570 per year. 23 It is unlikely that the public
would welcome such belt-tightening, particularly
if they see the money going from their pockets
into windfall profits for energy companies.
Whether the public would be much happier if the
money instead went to the government, as would
occur with a cap-and-spend policy (or a carbon
tax) is an open question. In contrast to these
other policies, cap-and-dividend protects the real
incomes of middle-class and low-income households. The political implications of these differences among policy outcomes should be evident.

Cap and Giveaway

-10.0%

Source: Calculated from Table 9..

Five caveats

and (v) the omission of sectoral employment
impacts.

Like all models of the distributional impacts of
public policies, the estimates presented in Table
7 rest on a number of simplifying assumptions.
We want to note five caveats in particular: (i) the
assumption that the cost of carbon permits is
passed through fully to consumers, rather than
part of the cost being absorbed by producers via
lower profit margins; (ii) the assumption of constant price elasticities of demand across expenditure deciles; (iii) the omission of welfare effects
from our calculations; (iv) the omission of fossil
fuel uses not tied to household consumption;

“Pass-through” to consumers. Studies of environmental policies – whether in the form of
regulations, pollution taxes, or marketable pollution permits – typically assume that the costs
these policies impose on firms are fully passed
through to consumers in the form of higher
prices. We have followed this conventional practice. It is plausible, however, that some fraction
of the costs of carbon permits will be absorbed
by producers via reduced profits – a possibility
that may help to explain why producers often
oppose environmental protection policies.
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One reason why some firms might not shift the
entire cost of carbon charges forward to consumers is that they are competing with other
firms that are not equally impacted by the
charges. Production costs of firms using less
carbon-intensive technologies will rise less than
those of firms in the same industry that use
more carbon-intensive technologies. 24 To defend their market shares, the latter may trim
profit margins rather than increasing prices to
consumers enough to cover the full cost of their
carbon permits. The ability of firms to absorb
permit costs would be enhanced if they have
been earning above-normal profits (for example,
due to oligopolistic market power).
Households would bear the cost of any profit
squeeze in proportion to their ownership of corporate stock. As noted above, this is highly unequal. Less-than-100% pass-through therefore
would reduce the regressivity of carbon charges
and enhance the progressivity of a cap-anddividend policy. In the Appendix, we report calculations on distributional outcomes based on
varying assumptions as to the actual extent of
pass-through.
Constant price elasticities. In our calculations
we assume that all households respond identically to price changes; that is, the price elasticity
of demand does not vary across the expenditure
spectrum. But there are plausible reasons to
think that price elasticities may vary with income. For example, lower-income households
may tend to respond more strongly to higher
prices than upper-income households: with less
money, they have a stronger incentive to
economize. 25 In one of the few empirical studies
of this question, West and Williams (2004) find
that the lower-income households are more responsive to changes in the price of gasoline: in
the poorest quintile they estimate the price elasticity of demand to be -0.73 (in other words, a
10% price rise leads to a 7.3% decline in demand), whereas in the richest quintile the price
elasticity is only -0.18. If this pattern could be
generalized, it would imply that our estimates
overstate the impact of carbon charges on lower-

expenditure households and hence understate
the progressivity of a cap-and-dividend policy. 26
Welfare effects. Our calculations refer only to
the real-income effects of carbon charges and
revenue recycling. As noted above, we do not
attempt to take into account the positive and
negative welfare effects arising from reduced
use of fossil fuels. But it bears repeating that
the underlying rationale for policies to curb carbon emissions is that the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs. In an analysis of welfare
effects that excludes benefits from reduced
global warming, De Canio (2007) concludes that
the distribution of carbon revenues has much
stronger effects on household incomes than the
macroeconomic effects of the carbon cap, and
that an egalitarian distribution of carbon revenues “will improve the material well-being of a
majority of the agents, even without taking into
account the environmental benefits of the
emissions reductions.”
Our analysis also does not take into account the
diminishing marginal utility of income, the eminently plausible proposition that a dollar is
worth more to a poor person than to a rich one.
A cap-and-dividend policy would transfer dollars
from richer households, where the marginal
utility of a dollar is relatively low, to poorer ones,
where the marginal utility of a dollar is relatively
high. The incorporation of such “interpersonal
comparisons” into a welfare-based accounting
of distributional impacts would further reinforce
the progressivity of the cap-and-dividend policy’s outcome.
Non-household users of fossil fuels. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data on which
we rely for our calculations omit non-household
end-users of fossil fuels and other goods and
services. According to the national income accounts (NIA), consumption represented 71% of
U.S. GDP in 2003 (the remaining items are investment, net exports, and government spending). 27 This is fairly close to the ratio of our CEXbased measure of carbon emissions reported
in Table 4 (3.67 mt/person/year) to total
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U.S. emissions reported in Figure 1b (5.46
mt/person/year). 28
Carbon permits will raise prices to nonhousehold end-users, too. For simplicity, we
have omitted these from our calculations of
both revenue and dividends, but the distributional outcome is not greatly affected by the
omission. Assuming that carbon charges associated with investment are passed to consumers in the same way as variable input costs, the
inclusion of investment would simply increase
the magnitudes of revenue and dividends without altering substantially the distributional pattern of net benefits. 29 Since carbon permit
charges are levied on exports but not imports,
omission of trade effects leads to a modest understatement of net benefits to U.S. households: part of the revenue rebated to them
comes from foreign consumers, while the permit
charges do not raise import prices. 30
In the case of government, there are two ways
to offset the impacts of higher fossil-fuel prices
on real expenditure while providing the governments with an incentive to improve energy
efficiency and shift to alternative energy
sources. The first is to earmark a share of total
carbon revenues to be directly recycled to federal, state and local governments, according to
a formula based on their expenditures. Assuming this share equals what they pay in increased
costs as a result of higher fossil-fuel prices, our
calculations of net benefits would be unaffected. The second option is to dividend all of
the carbon revenue to households, and let governments recoup their higher costs through
taxation. Assuming this is accomplished through
progressive taxes, this would enhance the progressivity of net benefits from the cap-anddividend policy.
Employment effects. Finally, our calculations do
not include the short-run impacts of carbon
emission-reduction policies on employment.
These include both negative impacts on fossil
fuel-based sectors of the economy and positive
impacts on other sectors, notably those involving alternative energy sources. Since the shift in

relative prices raises labor demand in some
sectors while lowering it in others, there is no
obvious reason to expect a substantial impact
on aggregate employment. But insofar as alternative energy sectors are more labor-intensive
than fossil-fuel industries – and there is some
evidence that this is the case – the change may
generate net increases in employment, particularly if investments are channeled into communities with high unemployment rates.
Labor does not move costlessly across industries and sectors, however. As we have noted,
workers in fossil fuel-intensive industries could
experience income losses as a result of policies
that curtail carbon emissions. These adverse
impacts could be offset by the provision of transitional adjustment assistance to the affected
households and communities, an issue to which
we turn in the next section. It is worth noting,
however, that this issue arises with any public
policy to reduce carbon emissions, not only a
cap-and-dividend policy. Indeed, from the standpoint of displaced workers, cap-and-dividend
at least has the advantage of offsetting the
impact of higher fossil fuel prices on their real
incomes, in the absence of which they would
face a double blow from price effects as well
as employment impacts.

V . E A R M A RK S F O R
N ON - DI VI DEN D U SE S
In this section we examine how the distributional outcome of a cap-and-dividend policy
would differ if part of the revenue from carbon
permits is earmarked initially for other uses,
such as transitional adjustment assistance,
rather than being entirely recycled as individual
dividends.
The baseline results reported above assumed
that all of the carbon revenues are recycled to
individuals in the form of equal per capita dividends. It is possible, however, that policy makers
will decide to earmark part of the revenue from
the sale of carbon permits for other uses, particularly during the first few years of the policy’s im-
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TABLE 10: EFFECT OF WITHHOLDING CARBON REVENUES FOR OTHER USES
Per capita
expenditure decile

Per capita
expenditure ($)

Net benefit/expenditure with different withholding percentages
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

1

1927

24.0%

22.3%

20.6%

18.9%

17.2%

15.5%

2

3521

9.7%

8.7%

7.8%

6.8%

5.9%

5.0%

3

4736

5.4%

4.7%

4.0%

3.3%

2.6%

1.9%

4

5991

2.7%

2.2%

1.6%

1.1%

0.5%

0.0%

5

7380

1.4%

0.9%

0.5%

0.0%

-0.4%

-0.9%

6

8847

0.3%

0.0%

-0.4%

-0.8%

-1.2%

-1.5%

7

10711

-0.5%

-0.8%

-1.1%

-1.4%

-1.8%

-2.1%

8

13228

-1.2%

-1.5%

-1.7%

-2.0%

-2.2%

-2.5%

9

17178

-2.0%

-2.2%

-2.4%

-2.6%

-2.8%

-3.0%

10

29943

-2.7%

-2.8%

-2.9%

-3.0%

-3.1%

-3.2%

Source: Authors’ calculations.

plementation. For example, part of the revenue
might be devoted to transitional adjustment assistance for workers and communities that suffer
employment losses as a result of the reduced
production and consumption of fossil fuels.
Other possible uses of carbon revenues include
spending on public goods (such as investments
in renewable energy), cuts in other taxes, and
what might be termed transitional adjustment
assistance to corporations (for example, via
give-aways of a fraction of the carbon permits
free-of-charge). Each of these may have its own
attractions on political grounds, but there are
economic and political costs to devoting more
than a modest share of carbon revenues to
them for reasons explained below.
The effects of withholding carbon revenues for
other uses are shown in Table 10. We vary the
percentage withheld from zero to 25% in five
percentage-point increments, to show the sensitivity of our results to alternative assumptions.
As the percentage earmarked for other uses
goes up, net benefits to households go down
and the percentage of households who come
out ahead (in purely monetary terms) decreases. Whereas the bottom six deciles receive
positive net benefits when 100% of the revenue
is distributed in individual dividends (our baseline scenario, reproduced in the first column),
only the bottom half receive positive net benefits with 10% of the revenue earmarked for

other uses. With 20% earmarked for other uses,
only the bottom four deciles come out ahead.
Note that these results refer only to the net impact of higher fossil fuel prices and individual
dividends, without taking into account the distributional effects of other uses of carbon revenues. The latter would depend, of course, on
precisely what these other uses are. If the other
uses benefit lower-income and middle-income
households, their losses from lower dividends
could be offset and the distributional progressivity of the overall result possibly enhanced. On
the other hand, if the other uses primarily benefit upper-income households, this would reduce
their losses and diminish the progressivity of
the policy mix.
In our view, there are good economic and political reasons to minimize the extent of nondividend uses of carbon revenues:
•

First, the scale of other uses must be limited
if we are to meet the central policy goal of
reducing carbon emissions while protecting
the real incomes of lower-income and middle-income households. We regard income
protection as a crucial ingredient of climate
policy: any policy that instead puts the
economic burden on the poor and middle
class risks a political backlash that could fatally undermine public support for curbing
carbon emissions.
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•

•

•

•

Second, greater investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy sources will
be induced by raising the price of fossil
fuels and eliminating the implicit subsidy
these now receive by virtue of the zeropricing of carbon emissions. Such investment could – and, we believe, should – be
boosted further by redirecting explicit subsidies from fossil fuels to renewables. Currently, federal subsidies for the fossil-fuel
industry in the form of tax breaks and royalty-free access to public lands are worth
$24 billion per year (Andrews, 2007). 31 Reorienting these would dramatically increase
federal support for energy efficiency and renewables without tapping the revenue from
sales of carbon permits.
Third, every dollar of revenues that is devoted to other uses is deducted equally from
the dividends of all Americans, rich and poor
alike. In other words, it is equivalent to a
head tax: by taking a fixed amount from
each person, it takes a higher percentage of
income from the poor than from the rich. In
effect, this would be one of the most regressive taxes in the country, a retreat from the
principle of using progressive taxation to
fund social expenditures.
Fourth, using carbon revenues to make an
equivalent cut in payroll taxes – as former
vice-president Al Gore has advocated –
would fail to protect the real incomes of
lower-income and middle-income population
who do not pay these taxes, including the
elderly, the disabled and the unemployed. 32
It would also tie the future of Social Security
and Medicare to a funding source that ultimately will shrink as the transition to a postfossil fuel economy moves forward.
Finally, if carbon revenues are used to finance government expenditures or tax cuts,
there is no guarantee as to what these uses
will turn out to be. Instead of a cut in payroll
taxes, for example, we could see a cut in
corporate income taxes; indeed, this is the
alternative to the cap-and-dividend policy

that was analyzed in the CBO studies. Instead of financing expenditures on renewable energy or mass transit, we could see
increased government spending on subsidies for fossil fuel corporations. We live with
the administrations we have, not necessarily
those we want. A policy in which the revenues are dedicated to individual dividends
comes as close as possible to building a
“locked box” that is not vulnerable to political vicissitudes in future years.

VI . CONCLUSI ON S
A cap-and-dividend policy would combine an
effective means to curb U.S. carbon emissions
from burning fossil fuels with protection of real
incomes of lower-income and middle-income
Americans from the consequences of higher
fossil fuel prices.
Any policy that reduces carbon emissions will
raise the prices of fossil fuels: higher prices are
the handmaiden of lower demand. Higher prices
for oil, coal, and natural gas will mean higher
prices for goods and services produced with
them. As documented in this study, these higher
prices will hit the real incomes of lower-income
and middle-income households harder than
those of upper-income households.
But higher prices for fossil fuels are only one
side of the story. The other side is summed up
by the question, “Who gets the money?” If the
money is recycled to the public on an equal per
capita basis, via cap-and-dividend, the impact of
the emissions-reduction policy on the distribution of incomes is transformed: lower-income
and middle-income households come out ahead
in monetary terms, both absolutely and relative
to upper-income groups.
A cap-and-dividend policy has three basic steps:
•

First, U.S. carbon emissions are capped at a
level that gradually declines over time. For
example, if we reduce emissions at a rate of
4% per year starting in 2010, we will cut
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emissions to 20% of their 2010 level by the
year 2050.
•

•

Second, based on the cap in a given year,
permits are auctioned to firms that bring
fossil carbon into the economy (whether
through domestic extraction or imports). The
supply of permits in a given year is fixed by
the cap; their price depends on the demand
for them.
Third, the revenue from the sale of permits
is deposited into a trust fund and paid out to
all individuals on an equal per person basis.
In addition, some fraction of the revenue initially may be earmarked for other uses, such
as transitional adjustment assistance.

A cap-and-dividend policy has several attractive
features. It asserts the principle of common
ownership of nature’s wealth: rights to benefit
from the U.S. share of the Earth’s capacity to
absorb carbon are allocated equally to all
Americans. It protects the real incomes of the
majority of the population, overcoming a crucial
political hurdle to the adoption of effective policies to curb global warming. It results in a progressive redistribution of income, a result that
does not hinge on the propensity of present and
future governments to use the revenues for
egalitarian purposes.
At a permit price of $200 per ton of carbon, the
annual revenue from the sale of permits would
amount to roughly $200 billion. If this revenue is
recycled to individuals equally, the majority of
households will receive positive net benefits:
their dividends exceed the amount they pay as a
result of higher fossil fuel prices. The net impact
ranges from a 2.7% loss for the richest 10% of
households to a 24.0% gain for the poorest 10%.

This “baseline scenario” assumes that 100% of
the cost of carbon permits is shifted to consumers. If the extent of pass-through to consumers
is less than 100%, and some of the cost is absorbed via lower profit margins, then the distributional progressivity of the outcome is
enhanced and the percentage of American families who come out ahead increases.
Allowing a modest fraction of the carbon revenues to be earmarked initially for other uses,
such as transitional adjustment assistance,
could further enhance the political appeal of the
cap-and-dividend policy. Our results indicate
that up to ten per cent of the carbon revenues
can be dedicated to other uses while maintaining positive net benefits for roughly 50% of
households; withholding carbon revenues beyond the 10% threshold pushes the net beneficiary share of the population below half.
In sum, a cap-and-dividend policy is a “win-win”
option for the majority of Americans, maintaining or increasing real incomes while curbing
global warming and hastening the U.S. economy’s transition towards the energy sources of
the future. Not only is it an attractive policy on
environmental, economic, and political grounds;
it is, as far as we know, the only policy that
combines these virtues in a realistic proposal. If
the American public engages actively in shaping
the nation’s climate policies, the cap-anddividend policy could become not just an attractive idea but a historic breakthrough.

A PP EN DI X :
Distributional Impact with Less-than-100%
Pass-through to Consumers
In this appendix, we examine how the distributional impact of a cap-and-dividend policy would
differ if part of the cost of carbon permits is absorbed by producers in the form of lower profit
margins, rather than being passed fully to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Little empirical research has been done to ascertain the extent to which the cost of carbon
permits will be passed through to consumers. In
a recent literature review, Parry et al. (2005, p.
32) remark that “empirical studies on the extent
to which the costs of environmental policies are
passed forward into higher prices of consumer
products would be extremely valuable.” Studies
on the extent of pass-through of sales and excise taxes have generated mixed results: some
studies have found close to 100% pass-through,
some have found significantly less, and still others have found “overshifting” in which prices
rise by more than the amount of the tax (Fullerton and Metcalf 2004, pp. 1817-1823). 33
If firms absorb part of the cost of carbon permits via lower profit margins, this has two effects on our calculations. First, it reduces the
incomes of households in proportion to their
ownership of corporate stock. Second, it translates into a higher permit price and higher total
revenues for a given emission cap. (Permit

prices rise because the reduction in demand for
fossil fuels is a function of the price increases
passed through to consumers; total revenues
rise because demand is price-inelastic).
To examine the effects of less-than-100% passthrough of carbon charges to consumers, we
assume that reductions in corporate profits are
distributed amongst households on the basis of
stock ownership as reported in Table 8. We vary
the share of permit costs absorbed via lower
profits from 0% (our baseline scenario) to 25%
in five percentage-point increments, to show the
sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions. That is, we allow the percentage of the
carbon charge that is passed through to consumers to vary from 75% to 100%.
The results are presented in Table A.1. The first
column – with zero charge from profits, or 100%
pass-through – shows the net distributional impact of the cap-and-dividend policy as reported
in Table 7. Subsequent columns show the distributional impact with rising shares of the permit price coming from corporate profits. As the
pass-through to consumers diminishes, net
benefits to lower-income and middle-income
households increase. Insofar as the carbon
charges cut into corporate profits rather than
being shifted fully to consumers, our baseline
results understate the favorable distributional
impacts of the cap-and-dividend policy.
s

TABLE A.1: IMPACT OF VARYING PERCENTAGE OF CHARGE FROM PROFITS

Per capita expenditure Per capita
decile
expenditure ($)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

1

1927

24.00%

25.70%

27.60%

29.70%

32.20%

35.00%

2

3521

9.70%

10.60%

11.70%

12.90%

14.30%

15.90%

3

4736

5.40%

6.00%

6.80%

7.70%

8.60%

9.80%

4

5991

2.70%

3.20%

3.80%

4.40%

5.10%

5.90%

5

7380

1.40%

1.80%

2.20%

2.60%

3.20%

3.80%

6

8847

0.30%

0.60%

0.80%

1.10%

1.50%

1.90%

7

10711

-0.50%

-0.30%

-0.20%

0.00%

0.20%

0.50%

8

13228

-1.20%

-1.10%

-1.00%

-0.90%

-0.80%

-0.70%

9

17178

-2.00%

-2.10%

-2.10%

-2.20%

-2.20%

-2.30%

-2.70%
$200.00

-3.30%
$210.53

-4.10%
$222.22

-4.90%
$235.29

-5.80%
$250.00

-6.90%
$266.67

10
29943
Carbon charge (per tC)

Net benefit /expenditure with different percentage of charge from profits

Note: Assumes 100% revenue recycling via dividends.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

s
Notes
EU-15 refers to the fifteen member states of the European
Union as of 1995. Emissions for Germany prior to German
reunification in 1990 are the total for West Germany and
East Germany.

1

2 Emissions resulting from electricity use are allocated across
fuel sources on the basis of total emissions from the electric
power sector. Emissions by sector:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec12_5.pdf.
Emissions from electricity generation by fuel source:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec12_16.pdf.

The data in Table 2 are drawn from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, conducted quarterly for the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics by the Census Bureau. We pooled annual
consumption data for households that began participating in
the survey from the 3rd quarter of 2002 through the 2nd
quarter of 2003.

3

We calculated separate price impacts for air transport and
“other transport” (including trains and mass transit), categories combined in Metcalf’s study, using data from the 1992
input-output accounts (Lawson 1997).

4

The higher per capita emissions shown in Figure 1b (5.5
tC) include carbon emissions from other sources, such as
government expenditure, in addition to those associated
with household consumption.

5

This is what happened when the European Union introduced carbon permits for electric power generation and
gave them free-of-charge to utility companies. For accounts,
see Ball (2006) and Dutzik et al. (2007. p. 22). As Paltsev et
al. (2007, p. 5) note, if regulated utility markets were to
prevent price rises (and windfall profits), this would dissipate the incentive for consumers to curb consumption.

6

This is an extension of the ‘feebate’ concept, whereby fees
are paid according to the extent of individual resource use,
and the proceeds rebated equally to all use-rights holders.
This idea has been applied to a variety of environmental
problems; see, for example, Puig-Ventosa (2004). For an
early application to gasoline taxes, see Shepard (1976).

7

The so-called “tragedy of the commons” – in which unrestricted access to a scarce resource leads to its overuse – is
more accurately termed the tragedy of open access, since
communities often devise rules to protect common-property
resources. Open access often leads to a second tragedy, too:
those who reap most of the short-run benefits from open
access are the wealthy and powerful, while those most severely impacted by the long-run costs are the poor and relatively powerless. For discussion, see Boyce (2002, pp. 7-8).

8

It is possible to design alternative uses of carbon-charge
revenues that are superior, at least in theory, to lump-sum
redistribution on efficiency or distributional grounds (see
Zhang and Baranzini 2004, pp. 511-2). In practice, however,
these alternatives would be subject to the vagaries of fiscal
politics. Moreover, Unlike the cap-and-dividend policy, they

9

would not affirm the fundamental principle of equal rights to
nature’s common wealth.
10 For discussion of administrative costs, see also Fisher et
al. (1998). As the CBO (2001, p. 19) notes, administrative
costs would increase if charges were levied not only on fossil
fuels, but also on imports of carbon-intensive products (such
as aluminum) so as to avoid placing domestic producers at a
disadvantage in the absence of similar carbon policies in the
exporting countries. Presumably these cost increases would
be offset by the additional revenue collected.
11 A recent study of Italy’s carbon tax (Tiezzi 2005) finds that
it has a progressive incidence, however, by virtue of the
facts that it is designed to hit transport fuels harder than
domestic fuel use and that higher-income Italian households were less responsive to higher prices.
12 In assessing distributional impacts, researchers often
stratify households on the basis of expenditure rather than
income, on the grounds that expenditure is a better proxy
for lifetime income and less subject to transitory shocks. We
do the same in this paper. If incidence instead is calculated
on the basis of income data, carbon charges generally appear to be even more regressive because expenditure-toincome ratios typically decline as incomes rise. For discussion, see Metcalf (1999).
13 The give-away option, sometimes referred to as “grandfathering,” was the main method adopted when sulfur dioxide emission permits were introduced in the U.S. in the
1990s. Insofar as the resulting windfall profits are taxed, this
method generates some government revenue (albeit less
than if the permits were sold by auction). In an analysis of the
effects of grandfathered carbon emissions permits with profits taxed at the rate of 35%, Parry (2004) likewise finds that
the distributional impact is regressive even when coupled
with lump-sum redistribution of the revenues recouped by
taxation, due to the skewed distribution of profit income.
14 The stronger distributional effects in the Dinan and
Rogers study arise mainly from (i) use of a lower value for
average income in the lowest quintile, and (ii) incorporation
of an estimated “deadweight loss” in factor markets due to
the impact of higher carbon prices on real returns to capital
and labor.

For a tool for calculating co-benefits, see Mulholland
(2007). For estimates of damages from releases of particulates, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides in the U.S., see
Muller and Mendelsohn (2007).
15

The authors assume that dividends are distributed
equally per person, rather than equally per household as in
the CBO (2000) and Dinan and Rogers (2002) studies.
16

A doubling of the permit price would not quite double total
revenue and net benefits, because it would entail reduced
demand and fewer permits.

17

18 For energy sectors, the elasticities are based on the literature review by Dahl (1993). For food, services, and in-
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dustrial goods, we use Williamson’s (2006) “stylized facts
of demand.”
This falls near the middle of the $50-300 billion/year
range (in 2007 dollars) that the U.S. Congressional Budget
Office (2007, p. 2) reports as the likely value of carbon
emission permits in 2020, based on a review of the existing
literature and the range of emission-reduction goals currently being debated.
19

20 One rationale sometimes offered for a cap-and-giveaway
strategy is that it would compensate shareholders of fossilfuel companies for declines in stock values arising from
lower sales. At the same time, however, shareholders of
renewable-energy companies would be expected to experience increases in stock values due to higher sales. Some
shareholders win, others lose. We see no compelling reason
for the public to insure the shareholders of polluting firms
against the risk that society will adopt policies to curb pollution. In any event, as the U.S. Congressional Budget Office
(2007, p. 5) notes, compensation to adversely affected
shareholders would require only a “small fraction” of the
total value of carbon permits. Goulder (2002) estimates that
a cap-and-giveaway policy with permits rising from a modest
initial price of $25/tC to a final price of $50/tC would lead
to a sevenfold increase in stock values for coal companies
and to a doubling of stock values for oil and gas firms.
21 The deciles in Table 8 are grouped by per capita income
rather than per capita expenditure. (The difference between
the two probably explains the anomalous finding that the
bottom decile owns somewhat more stock than the second
lowest decile.) We have not found comparable data for
expenditure deciles. These stock ownership data include
both direct ownership of stocks and indirect ownership
through mutual funds and other sources. For discussion,
see Bucks et al. (2006).

For simplicity, we assume that all windfall profits are
recycled to U.S. households in proportion to their stock
ownership. In practice, some profits would “leak” out of the
country in returns to foreign owners of stock in fossil-fuel
companies, diminishing net benefits of the cap-andgiveaway policy to U.S. households. Some profits might also
be withheld from shareholders and instead used to increase
executive compensation. For both reasons, the cap-andgiveaway results presented in Table 9 can be regarded as a
“best-case” approximation that, if anything, understates net
costs for the majority of households.
22

23 This is the average per capita charge for the 5th and 6th
deciles, multiplied by the average household size in these
deciles, as reported in Table 7.

A similar situation could arise for tradable goods producers who face competition from foreign firms not covered by
the carbon permit mandate. All else equal, the introduction
of carbon permits in the U.S. economy would make imports
more competitive and exports less competitive. In industries
where these trade effects are significant, there is a case for
corrective policies: tariffs on imports (based on fossil carbon
24

emissions in their production) and dividends on exports.
Careful research is needed to assess needs for such compensating policies. We note, however, that many foreign
competitors (notably in Europe) now pay higher prices for
fossil fuels than U.S. producers, due to government environmental and taxation policies. In these cases, it would be
difficult to argue that introducing carbon permits would place
U.S. firms at an unfair disadvantage. More generally, trade
competitiveness depends on many factors – including exchange rates, labor costs, taxation, and the pace of technological innovation – and these are likely to overshadow the
effects of environmental policies, which empirical studies
generally find to be quite small (for discussions, see Goodstein 1999 and Ackerman 2006).
To be sure, lower-income households devote a higher
proportion of their expenditure to necessities than to luxuries, and from this it is sometimes inferred that they tend to
be less responsive, for example, to changes in the price of
gasoline (Kayser 2000). But the same reasoning applies to
non-fuel expenditures by lower-income households: not
cutting gasoline consumption in response to higher prices
would imply bigger cutbacks in other necessities such as
food and health care. A more plausible reason to expect
greater price responsiveness among upper-income households is that in some cases (such as buying more energyefficient vehicles), cutbacks in fuel consumption require
investments in expensive durable goods.
25

26 Other studies of price elasticity differences across the
income spectrum have produced mixed results. West
(2004) and Archibald and Gillingham (1980) also find that
lower-income US households are more responsive to gasoline prices than are upper-income households, while Kayser
(2000) reports a contrary finding. In a study in the United
Kingdom, Dargay and Vythoulkas (1999) also find greater
price-responsiveness among lower-income households: the
long-run elasticity of car ownership with respect to running
costs is -0.92 for low-income groups, -0.51 for middleincome groups, and -0.38 for high-income groups (see also
U.K. Department for Transport, 2006). In a study of Denmark, Brännlund and Nordstrom (2004) find little variation
across income groups in the price elasticities of demand for
gasoline and other goods.

Unlike the CEX, the NIA consumption measure includes
expenditures by non-profit institutions serving households,
which account for roughly 11% of consumption, or 8% of
GDP (based on 1993 data cited by Garner et al. 2006, p.
22). Subtracting this from the NIA measure, household
consumption represented roughly 63% of national income.
27

28 Another possible source of discrepancy between the two
figures is under-reporting of consumption in the CEX. The
CEX-based estimate of total consumption in the United
States, derived from household surveys, is roughly 60% of
the National Income Accounts-based estimate of aggregate
consumption, derived primarily from economic censuses of
firms (for discussion, see Garner et al. 2006). In part, this
disparity arises from definitional differences (for example,
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the latter includes consumption by many non-profit institutions whereas the CEX does not), and in part from measurement errors in one or both instruments. Insofar as underreporting in the CEX accounts is to blame, this would affect
the pattern of distributional impacts reported here only if
the under-reporting were uneven across expenditure deciles. Since we lack adequate data on which to assess this
possibility, we make do with the data at hand. If the degree
of any under-reporting in the CEX is roughly constant across
deciles, then its only effect on the distributional impacts of a
cap-and-dividend policy reported in Table 7 would be on
absolute magnitudes, not on the pattern of relative impacts
across deciles.
If investment per unit output and carbon emissions per
dollar investment are roughly the same across sectors,
inclusion of investment-related emissions would somewhat
reduce the disparities in carbon content across consumption categories reported in Table 3. Since low-carbon categories account for a larger share of expenditure by upperincome households, this would reduce the regressivity of
carbon charges and enhance the progressivity of the capand-dividend outcome.

29

In some cases, however, trade policies may compensate
for these effects; see note 24.
30

31 To put this number in perspective, in 2005 public expenditure on research & development for wind energy, fuel cells
and photovoltaics combined was about $250 million (Kammen and Nemet 2005, p. 86).
32 See “Solving the Climate Crisis,” speech by Al Gore at
New York University, 18 September 2006. Available at
http://www.nyu.edu/community/gore.html.

NOTE TO APPENDIX

A related but distinct issue is the impact of higher prices
on the “welfare triangles” of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus. Basic microeconomic theory tells us that
the ratio of these welfare losses depends on price elasticities of demand and supply: the more inelastic the demand
curve, the higher the share of consumers; the more inelastic
the supply curve, the higher the share of producers. These
calculations assume that the full cost of carbon permits (or
carbon taxes) is passed through to consumers. If the supply
curve is not perfectly elastic, the reduction in output leads to
a decline in marginal cost and this dampens the rise in the
market price, but consumers still are assumed to pay the
full carbon charge (the difference between the marginal cost
of production without permits and the market price with
permits). Here we do not attempt to incorporate the welfare
losses from reduced consumers’ surplus and producers’
surplus, nor the welfare gains from reduced carbon emissions, for reasons explained in section 3.
33
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